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Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a
Unified Theory of Compensating
Bystanders and Relatives for
Intangible Injuries
By JOHN L. DIAMOND*
In its 1968 decision of Dillon v. Legg,' the California Supreme
Court rejected the majority rule and permitted a bystander who had
not been in the zone of physical danger to be compensated for negli-
gent infliction of mental distress. The court held that the defendant
owed a duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs, and enunciated three guide-
lines to help courts measure foreseeability.2 Sixteen years later, the
meaning and wisdom of the Dillon decision are still debated.3 While
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1. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. See infra text accompanying
notes 30-34.
3. See, e.g., Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical
Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163 (1976); Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "the Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAWAII L.
RFv. 1 (1979); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerg-
ingfrom Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 483 (1982); Pearson, Liability to Bystandersfor Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Ham-A Comment on the Nature ofArbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv.
477 (1982); Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between
California and New York, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1 (1976); Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foun-
dation ospitals: California Expands Liability For Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress,
33 HASTINGs L... 291 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Molen]; Comment, Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
13 PAC. L.J. 179, 201-05 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Horizons]; Comment, Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Reconciling the Bystander and Direct Victim Causes of
Action, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 145 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Reconciling]; Note,
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligence Actionsfor Emotional Distress and Loss of
Consortium Without Physical Injury, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1142 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Molien]; Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in
California and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248 (1974); Note, Limiting Liabilityfor the
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some states have rejected the Dillon analysis, 4 an increasing number of
jurisdictions are following California's lead by allowing bystanders
outside of the physical zone of danger to recover damages.5
Subsequent California cases have illustrated a weakness in the Dil-
lon approach. These later courts have applied the Dillon guidelines
mechanically, viewing them as strict preconditions to recovery.6 This
mechanical application has led to the erection of arbitrary limitations
on recovery bearing little relation to the principles of foreseeability es-
poused so forcefully in Dillon. While in some instances mental distress
is compensated, other equally forseeable mental injuries are not. The
result is feast or famine for the plaintiff depending on the fortuities of
time, location,7 or characterization of the plaintiff as "direct" or
"indirect."
8
There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the Dillon
court's use of the foreseeability standard. Courts have long recognized
the need to limit compensation for negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress to avoid massive liability and excessive costs that could hinder
socially important activities. 9 Yet it is generally quite foreseeable that
the relatives of victims will suffer some mental distress. Thus the use of
a pure foreseeability standard leads to the expansive compensation that
the courts have tried to avoid. The question becomes how to rationally
compensate victims of intangible torts while reasonably limiting the ex-
posure of defendants.
Some commentators believe that Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hos-
pitals10 points the way out of the Dillon quagmire. In Molien, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court limited the application of the Dillon guidelines
to bystanders who suffered as "percipient" witnesses to the injury of a
third person. In contrast, any foreseeable "direct" victim of the negli-
gent act I can recover without regard to the Dillon guidelines.' 2  Com-
mentators have urged that the Molien approach be extended to all cases
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The 'ystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L.
REv. 847 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting].
4. E.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969);
Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
5. See infra note 23.
6. See infra notes 38-56 & accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-56 & accompanying text.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
9. See infra notes 146-47 & accompanying text.
10. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
11. Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
12. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
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of negligent infliction of "serious" mental distress,' 3 whether the plain-
tiff is a "direct" or "indirect" victim. It is the purpose of this Article to
demonstrate that this and other recent proposals will not resolve the
fundamental Dillon dilemma, and that an alternative approach is
required.
Not only do courts struggling under the Dillon guidelines arrive at
inconsistent and inequitable results, but their failure to treat bystander
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress like claims for other
intangible torts, such as loss of consortium and loss of parent-child so-
ciety, 14 leads to further inconsistencies.' 5 This morass of conflicting
theories is a compelling demonstration of the desirability of the ap-
proach first elaborated by Professor Richard Miller: extending the de-
fendant's liability to allforeseeable plaintiffs but restricting the types of
damages that are recoverable. 16 By restricting compensable damages
13. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 3, at 609-10; Comment, Molien,supra note 3, at 312;
Note, Moline, supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1977). See infra notes 121-39 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 38-61 & accompanying text.
16. Miller, supra note 3, at 38-43. Courts so far have disregarded Professor Miller's
prescription. General academic criticism of awarding compensation for mental distress in
general has also been unsuccessful. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of
Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1953); Morris, Liabilityfor Pain and Suffering,
59 COLUM. L. REv. 476 (1959); O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Paymentfor
Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorney Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. 333;
O'Connell & Simon, Payment for Pain and Suffering: Who Wants What, When and Why?
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1. But see Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 509, 364
P.2d 337, 344, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (implying criticism of
compensation for mental distress in general).
There has been forceful criticism of the rationale for awarding damages for pain
and suffering in negligence cases. Such damages originated under primitive law as
a means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who had
been wronged. They become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a mech-
anized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly distribution of losses through
insurance and the price of goods or of transportation. Ultimately such losses are
borne by a public free of fault as part of the price for the benefits of mechanization.
Nonetheless, this state has long recognized pain and suffering as elements of dam-
ages in negligence cases; any change in this regard must await reexamination of the
problem by the Legislature. Meanwhile, awards for pain and suffering serve to
ease plaintiffs' discomfort and to pay for attorney fees for which plaintiffs are not
otherwise compensated.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Traynor's concession to established precedent would not ap-
ply to newly developing intangible torts. Justice Traynor dissented in Dillon, stating that he
would limit recovery to plaintiffs within the zone of physical danger. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 748, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968). Justice Traynor did, however,
endorse liability for intentional infliction of mental distress where the cost of compensation
would not be spread so as to excessively burden the insured community. See State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (Traynor, J.).
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to economic loss resulting from the negligent infliction of emotional
distress, as Professor Miller suggests, and substantially extending Pro-
fessor Miller's thesis to include loss of consortium and parent- and
child-society claims, the courts could develop an equitable and rea-
soned basis for compensation. Such a unified approach would provide
relief to foreseeable plaintiffs in all intangible tort cases, yet keep recov-
ery within economically acceptable limits. The recent California deci-
sion of Turpin v. Sortini,17 now followed in one other state,18 suggests
that some courts may be receptive to such an approach. 9
Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to allow compensation to
anyone for mental distress.20 The initial common law rule allowed re-
covery for mental pain only as parasitic damages accompanying physi-
cal injury,2' but the courts ultimately permitted compensation for
mental distress with any physical "impact," regardless of whether the
impact resulted in a physical "injury. '22 Subsequent "near miss" cases
led to the current majority rule allowing compensation for the negli-
gent infliction of mental distress to plaintiffs within the zone of physical
danger, even in the absence of physical impact.23 Under the majority
17. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
18. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 646 P.2d 483 (1983).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 152-57.
20. Objections advanced against allowing such recovery have included the inability to
measure such injury in terms of money, see, e.g., Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1929); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917
(1900), the potential for fraudulent claims, see, e.g., Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg,
212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905), the flood of litigation that would result from compensating
mental distress, and the concomitant cost to society, see, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. Ry. Co.,
168 Mass. 285,47 N.E. 88 (1897); Ward v. West Jersey & S. Ry. Co., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561
(1900).
21. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 50 (4th ed. 1971). The
intentional tort of assault constituted an early exception. See id. § 10, at 38. The tort of
intentional infliction of mental distress constituted a much more recent development. See
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); see also
supra note 16.
22. W. PROSSER, supra note note 21, § 54, at 331. See, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elev.
Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d
351 (1961).
23. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Battalla v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Niederman v. Brodsky, 435 Pa. 401,
261 A.2d 84 (1970). See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1034
(1956); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 148-49 (1959). Although the zone of danger rule remains
the position of a majority of states, a growing number of states have adopted the Dillon rule
or have expanded liability even further to allow recovery for bystanders. See, e.g., Haught
v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982); D'Amico v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn.
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rule today, the bystander must be in the zone of physical danger,24 and
the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff must be physically
manifested.
25
California Departs From the Majority
In Dillon v. Legg, 26 the California Supreme Court rejected the
Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W. 2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v.
Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406
A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffe, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
404 A.2d 672 (1979); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (rex. Civ. App. 1978); see also
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (extending
liability beyond the Dillon limitations by abandoning a strict "contemporaneous obser-
vance" requirement while affirming a substantial physical injury manifestation require-
ment). See generally Lambert, Tort Liabiliyfor Psychic Injuries: Overview and Update, 37
A. TRIAL LAW. AM. L.J. (1978).
24. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Guilmette v.
Alexander, 128 Va. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969). Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 436 (1965).
There is some question in several jurisdictions as to whether a plaintiff can recover
damages for the distress of witnessing another's injury, or only for the distress occasioned by
a fear for one's own safety. See, e.g., Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625
(1957); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956). Courts
expressly permitting recovery for the fear of another when the plaintiff is in the zone of
danger include Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Greenberg v. Stanley,
51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 488 (1958). As a practical matter it is difficult to differentiate
distress resulting from fear for one's own safety and fear for another's, and thus some juris-
dictions have not focused on the distinction and permit full recovery for all mental distress
so long as the plaintiff was within the zone of physical danger. See Hambrook v. Stokes
Brothers, 1 K.B. 141 (1925); W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 54, at 333-34.
25. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 23, at 1031-33; W. PROSSER, supra note 21,
§ 54, at 328; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment b (1965). Some courts
make an exception in cases involving telegraphic companies and negligent mishandling of
corpses from this requirement. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 8, 179 N.W.2d 390,
392 (1970); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 54, at 329-30. Such physical manifestation
is seen in part to authenticate the severity of the mental distress. But see Hedlund v. Supe-
rior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 706 n.8, 669 P.2d 41, 47 n.8, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805, 811 n.8 (1983)
(rejecting majority rule's requirement of physical manifestation); Molien v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928-31, 616 P.2d 813, 819-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 838-39 (1980)
(same). See infra notes 109-16 & accompanying text. However, recent advances in medical
science and psychiatry as well as related developments in the law have blurred the meaning
of "physical manifestations." Some courts have held that relatively minor physical symp-
toms, which often depend on the plaintifi's own testimony for verification, are sufficient to
meet the requirement. See, e.g., Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 15-16, 179 N.W.2d 390, 396
(1970). In many instances this has eliminated a potential barrier to compensation for all
mental distress. See infra notes 111-13 & accompanying text. Nevertheless, most courts still
require physical manifestation of some kind. Mollen v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d
916, 925-26, 616 P.2d 813, 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436A (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 54 at 328-29.
26. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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zone of danger requirement, holding that a mother could recover for
physically manifested severe mental distress suffered when she wit-
nessed her daughter being struck by a negligently operated automobile.
The facts in Dillon presented a particularly compelling basis for re-
jecting the zone of danger requirement. The plaintiffs, a mother and
daughter, both witnessed another daughter being hit and killed, but
only the surviving daughter was arguably in the zone of physical dan-
ger.27 The Dillon majority found it inappropriate that a "few yards"
difference should preclude the mother from recovering for emotional
trauma.28 Consequently, the court reversed its position that the con-
cept of a limited duty precludes liability to a plaintiff outside the zone
of physical danger, noting that "[i]n the absence of 'overriding policy
considerations . . . foreseeability of risk [is] of. . . primary impor-
tance in establishing the element of duty.' "29 The majority rejected the
argument that permitting recovery to bystanders for the negligent in-
fliction of mental distress would flood the courts with "fraudulent" and
"inadequate" claims, 30 stating that "[i]n order to limit the otherwise
potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, the
law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which
to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable."
'31
The Dillon court thus established foreseeability as the chief ele-
ment limiting the defendant's duty and, therefore, liability. While the
court recognized that "no immutable rule can establish the extent of
that obligation for every circumstance of the future," 32 it listed three
factors to take into account when determining "whether defendant
should reasonably foresee the injury. to plaintiff" and thereby owe the
plaintiff "a duty of due care"
33:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its oc-
currence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related,
as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of
only a distant relationship.
34
27. Id. at 732-33, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
28. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
29. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (quoting Grafton v. Mollica, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 860, 865, 42 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 (1965)).
30. Id. at 736-39, 441 P.2d at 917-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-79.
31. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 917-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
32. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 917-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
33. Id.
34. Id at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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Like jurisdictions following the majority rule, the court expressly
confined its ruling to cases in which the plaintiff suffered mental dis-
tress that resulted in physical manifestations.3 5 The court also made
clear that its concept of reasonable foreseeability was to be applied by
an objective standard.36 The Dillon majority viewed its adoption of the
foreseeability standard as a resolution of the compensation problem by
"application of the principles of tort, not by the creation of exceptions
to them. '3
7
The Dilon Disaster: Mechanical Application and
Inequitable Distinctions
A review and comparison of subsequent California cases illus-
trates the confusion and inconsistencies resulting from Dillon. In
Hathaway v. Superior Court,38 for example, the plaintiff's son was elec-
trocuted by touching an evaporative cooler while playing outside. Al-
though the child's mother heard her son make a noise, it was not "like a
scream or cry and it did not alarm her."39 Shortly thereafter, Mrs.
Hathaway heard her son's playmate say, "Let go, Michael, let go," but
this remark still did not alarm the adults in the house. The playmate
then rushed into the house and explained that something was wrong
with Michael. Within a minute or two of hearing her son make the
noise, Mrs. Hathaway arrived with her husband to see their son lying in
a puddle of water by the cooler in a "dying state." When the parents
reached their son he still had a recognizable pulse, but his mother was
not sure he was breathing. 40
The appellate court held that since the child "was no longer grip-
ping the water cooler and receiving the electrical charge, ... [t]he
35. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
36. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. According to the court, reasonable
foreseeability "does not turn on whether the particular defendant as an individual would
have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that courts, on a case-
to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under such
circumstances should reasonably have foreseen." Id.
37. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85. The court continued: "Legal history
shows that artificial islands of exceptions, created from the fear that the legal process will not
work, usually do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into oblivion." Id.
"The refusal to apply these general rules to actions for this particular kind ofphysical injury
is nothing short of a denial of justice." Id. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84
(quoting Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REv. 260, 277 (1921)) (emphasis
added). See infra notes 110-39 & accompanying text (discussion of distinction between
physical and intangible injuries).
38. 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
39. Id. at 730, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
40. Id. at 730-31, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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event which constituted the accident had ended."' 41 Consequently, the
court found that the parents had not "sensorily perceived the injury-
causing event" but only had perceived the results after the accident was
over.42 This was held insufficient to meet the Dillon requirement of a
"direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contem-
poraneous observance of the accident.
'43
The Hathaway court distinguished the facts before it from those of
Nazaroff v. Superior Court,44 in which another California appellate
court allowed a mother to be compensated for distress after arriving at
a neighbor's pool just as her three year old son was being pulled from
the water, still alive. In Nazaroff, the court held that the jury could
have concluded that the accidental drowning was still in progress.
45
The Hathaway court also distinguished Archibald v. Braverman,46 in
which the mother of a thirteen year old boy severely injured in a gun-
powder explosion was permitted to recover for her emotional distress.
Although inArchibald the mother arrived "within moments" of the ex-
plosion, the Hathaway court noted that Archibald "has been explained
in numerous cases on the ground that the mother heard the explosion
and therefore sensorily perceived it."47
In another recent California case, Cortez v. Marcias,48 a mother
who had watched her child die in a hospital, allegedly as a result of the
hospital's negligence, was denied recovery for mental distress because
she had thought that the child was merely falling asleep. Only after she
had paid the hospital bill was she told that she had in fact witnessed
her son's death. The Cortez court concluded that the mother's shock
did not result from a contemporaneous observation but from learning
of her child's death moments later.49
41. Id. at 736, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
45. Id. at 566-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
46. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
47. Hathaway, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 439. Archibald has been dis-
tinguished in this manner in several cases, although the decision itself did not rely on the
mother's audio perception. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 584, 565 P.2d 122, 135,
139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 110 (1977); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 76, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031, 137
Cal. Rptr. 863, 872 (1977); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22,
24-25, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885 (1973).
48. 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980).
49. Id. at 650, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 910. See infra note 56 & accompanying text.
In a recent court of appeal decision, Ochoa v. County of Santa Clara, 191 Cal. Rptr. 907
(Cal. App. 1983) (depublished, hearing granted by California Supreme Court Sept. 29, 1983
(Civ. No. A017570)), the court denied the plaintiff parents recovery for mental distress
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Another appellate court faced with somewhat different facts came
to the opposite result. In Mobaldi v. Regents of University of Calfor-
nia,50 a foster mother, holding her child, saw him becoming spastic and
finally comatose when injected with a fifty percent glucose solution in-
stead of the prescribed five percent solution.51 Because the mother was
present at the scene and contemporaneously observed the injection of
the unsafe glucose solution, she was permitted to recover, even though
she was unaware at the time that negligence caused the accident.
5 2
The California Supreme Court itself has mechanically applied its
Dillon guidelines. Nine years after Dillon, in Justus v. Atchison, 53 the
court refused to allow a husband to recover for shock resulting from his
observation, while his wife was in labor, of allegedly negligent medical
procedures resulting in the death of the fetus. Although the husband
"witnessed certain disturbing developments in the delivery room" that
"no doubt induced a growing sense of anxiety on the plaintiff's part,"
the court found that the husband's "anxiety did not ripen into the disa-
bling shock which resulted from the death of the fetus until he was
actually informed of that event." 54 The court reaffirmed that "learning
of the accident from others after its occurence" will not support a cause
of action under Dillon.55 The court expressly approved the appellate
decisions that mechanically applied the Dillon guidelines.
56
Conversely, in the case of Krouse v. Graham,57 decided the same
year, the California Supreme Court allowed a husband to maintain a
claim for shock resulting from "perceiving" his wife killed in a collision
caused by alleged inadequate medical treatment given to their child because "[t]he allegedly
negligent acts and omissions complained of in the present case are not the type of generally
sudden occurences which have produced actionable shock or direct emotional impact in the
Dillon line of cases." Id. at 916. The Ochoa case is currently pending before the California
Supreme Court. See also Madigan v. City of Santa Anna, 145 Cal. App. 3d 607, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 593 (1983); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978);
Arnuz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977); Jansen v. Children's
Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
50. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
51. Id. at 578, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
52. Id. at 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
53. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
54. Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
55. Id. (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
80 (1968)).
56. Id. at 582-84, 565 P.2d at 134-35, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10. The court also noted
that, unlike in Dillon where the plaintiff was an "involuntary witness to the accident," the
husband was in the delivery room "by his own choice." Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 111. See also Cortez v. Marcias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 650, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905, 910
(1980).
57. 19 Cal. 3d 49, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
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while she was unloading groceries from the back seat of the car in
which he was sitting. The court was careful to emphasize that while the
husband did not actually see his wife being struck by the defendant's
car, he contemporaneously perceived the accident and its likely effect
through other than visual means.
58
Cases like Hathaway, Cortez, and Justus demonstrate the arbitrar-
iness inherent in a mechanical application of the Dillon guidelines. In
each case the plaintiff had perceived the allegedly negligent act and the
fatal result. It is not at all clear that the plaintiffs' mental anguish was
significantly diminished merely because they were not present at the
accident or did not recognize the significance of the event until later.
The eventual mental distress of each plaintiff was quite foreseeable.
While the Dillon court rejected the artificiality of awarding or denying
compensation for mental distress on the "happenstance" of a "few
yards," these later courts have determined liability on the happenstance
of a few seconds or minutes.
It can be argued, of course, that nothing is awry. While cases like
Hathaway, Cortez, and Justus may appear to unfairly deny compensa-
tion, the pre-Dillon majority rule clearly would have precluded com-
pensation in these cases because the bystander plaintiffs were not
themselves in the zone of danger. In other words, the effect of Dillon is
to extend the line and permit compensation in some additional cases.
It can be argued that whenever such a line is drawn, cases falling close
to the line will make any rule seem arbitrary. Furthermore, some may
argue that there is a real distinction between the psychological distress
suffered from witnessing injury to a close relative and learning of it
even moments later, and that a line drawn on this basis is not
arbitrary.
59
58. Id. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
In a recent court of appeal decision, Nevels v. Yeager, 152 Cal. App. 3d 162, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 300 (1984), the court held that "when a close relative arrives on the scene of an acci-
dent soon after its occurence, so that the scene is substantially as it was at the instant of the
accident and sees the victim, who has suffered severe injury with all its attendant gore, and
suffers shock therefrom, that relative has experienced shock contemporaneous with the acci-
dent." Id. at 170, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 310. In Nevels, the plaintiff was three quarters of a mile
away from the automobile accident that injured her child and arrived within ten minutes of
its occurence. The court rejected a strict application of the Dillon guidelines, emphasizing
the "substantially contemporaneous perception" of the accident. Id. While this is a less
mechanical approach, it is still arbitrary and does little to solve the problems in this area.
Perception of the accident scene, just like perception of the accident itself, is neither a pre-
requisite for foreseeable mental distress nor a fair means of determining whether recovery is
justified.
59. See Note, Limiting, supra note 3, at 868-70 (distinguishing between fear, shock, and
grief).
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Despite such justifications, there is something wrong with a stan-
dard expressly based on foreseeability that grants compensation in one
case but denies it in another case in which mental distress was just as
foreseeable.60 There is an internal contradiction between the passion-
ate Dillon mandate to apply the traditional foreseeability test to avoid
injustice, and the application of rules that preclude compensation on
the basis of the percipient witness' momentary delay in reaching the
accident or in recognizing its significance.
Some commentators have argued that this inconsistency does not
mean that Dillon is a poor decision, but simply that it is misunderstood
or misapplied. The three factors in Dillon, it is argued, were meant as
guidelines and not as strict rules to be applied mechanically. 61 Yet the
problem is more basic. The Dillon guidelines, which have been applied
by California courts as limitations on duty, do not rely solely on the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, as do many tradi-
tional barriers to tort recovery. Rather, they are based on the fortuities
of the circumstances in which the plaintiff suffered the injury. As a
result, these guidelines act neither as realistic indicators of foreseeabil-
ity nor as rational limitations on the recovery of damages for such
injuries.
The Flaws in the Dillon Foreseeability Standard
Guidelines that Don't Guide
The Dillon court used foreseeability as a limit on duty. The con-
cept of limited duty is used by courts to limit the liability of persons
who act unreasonably, and is based on policy considerations that out-
weigh the policy of compensating victims of negligent conduct.62 Ordi-
narily, a plaintiff suing a defendant for negligent conduct is permitted
to recover upon a showing that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty
60. See supra note 47.
61. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 3, at 620-21. Cf. supra note 58.
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 53, at 324-25. The California Supreme Court has
attacked, on a variety of fronts, traditional limitations on a defendant's duty to foreseeable
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 173 Cal. Rptr.
783 (1981) (eliminated limitation on the duty owed by the owners of undeveloped land for
injuries caused to adjacent landowners); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106
Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (held that so-called "guest statutes," which limit the duty owed by a
driver to his passenger, violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection); Gibson v.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (abrogated parental immu-
nity); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (over-
turned the traditional rule that landowners do not owe a legal duty of reasonable care to
social guests or trespassers).
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because he or she was a "foreseeable" plaintiff, that the defendant's
behavior was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that this be-
havior was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.
63
Yet the "limited duty" concept even limits the defendant's poten-
tial liability with regard to "foreseeable" plaintiffs. 64 Policy considera-
tions may require greater restrictions on a particular defendant's
potential liability than the restrictions provided by foreseeability alone,
due to the defendant's special status or relationship with the plaintiff.
65
Limited duty also has been used to limit liability for special categories
of behavior even when such behavior is both unreasonable and the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.
66
Limited duty for mental distress as expressed in the Dillon guide-
lines, however, focuses neither entirely on status nor on behavior. It
instead limits liability based on the fortuitous circumstances in which
the plaintiff suffered the damage. The plaintiff outside the foreseeable
zone of physical injury but within the foreseeable zone of psychological
injury can only recover, under the prevailing rigid interpretations of
Dillon, if Dillon's three criteria are met. Oddly, only one of these three
criteria is consistent with a foreseeability analysis.
The Dillon criterion that requires a close relationship between the
victim and the bystander plaintiff67 is clearly relevant to a foreseeabil-
ity analysis. It is relatively unlikely that a bystander will suffer
profound mental distress upon learning of a stranger's tragedy. It is
more foreseeable that a bystander will suffer profound shock upon wit-
nessing a stranger suffer injury, but this result is still much less likely
than when the victim is a close relative.68 If this were the only Dillon
63. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 53, at 324-25.
64. Id.
65. For example, "Good Samaritan" statutes designed to encourage physicians to treat
those in need of emergency care restrict liability for negligent medical care when there is a
particular relationship between the doctor and his or her patient. See Comment, The Good
Samaritan and the Law, 32 TENN. L. Rnv. 287 (1965); Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 38 TEMPLE L.Q. 418 (1965).
66. The courts' reluctance to impose an affirmative duty to rescue in the absence of a
special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff exemplifies this kind of limited
duty. It may be unreasonable not to throw a life preserver to a drowning person, but courts
usually hold that there is no legal duty to do so. See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 56, at
338-50; Boblen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv.
217 (1908); Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study ofLaw andAltruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
67. Dillon, 58 Cal. 2d at 741,441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
68. While courts have construed this third Dillon guideline to exclude non-family rela-
tionships, a more liberal concept of "close relationship" would be a better predictor of severe
emotional distress. See Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980) (non-
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criterion used to limit compensation, it could hardly be called arbitrary
or inconsistent with foreseeability concepts, although some foreseeable
plaintiffs would still be denied compensation. Indeed, it essentially
would be an extension of liability based on loss of consortium and loss
of society tort theories.
The other two Dillon guidelines, however, are problematical. The
criterion of "nearness" '69 seems far from essential to a foreseeability
analysis. 70 It has not been shown, and it is not self-evident, that prox-
imity to the accident necessarily determines the severity of psychologi-
cal trauma. In fact, the relative's guilt feelings about not being present
could exacerbate the psychological trauma in certain cases. If the se-
vere mental distress of bereaved relatives does not hinge on how "near"
they were to the scene, it follows that the primary policy rationale for
including a spatial condition is not to ensure that the plaintiff was fore-
seeable, but to limit damages by precluding some foreseeable plaintiffs
from suing or recovering.
Dillon's "direct emotional impact from sensory and contempora-
neous observance" limitation 7' is also irrelevant to a foreseeability
analysis. The close relative must arrive while the accident is still occur-
ring, not a second later when only the destructive aftermath exists.
72
While the Dillon majority balked at denying liability on the basis of a
few feet, cases like Hathaway, Cortez, and Justus use this "contempora-
neous observance" criterion to limit liability on the basis of a few mo-
ments.73 Again there is no persuasive evidence that contemporaneous
sensory perception of the actual accident is a prerequisite of severe
mental harm, or that such perception merits compensation while wit-
nessing the destructive results does not. Dillon has replaced an arbi-
trary spatial boundary with an arbitrary temporal limit.
married roommates). But see Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 48, 188 Cal. Rptr.
503 (1983) (court allowed a common law spouse to recover for loss of consortium, relying in
part on Judge Poche's strong dissent in Drake). Contra Hendrix v. General Motors Corp.,
144 Cal. App. 3d 296, 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983) (common law spouse).
69. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
70. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969)
(rejects Dillon and adheres to zone of danger rule for this reason).
71. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
72. Compare Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1978), with Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
But see Nevels v. Yeager, 152 Cal. App. 3d 162, 199 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1984) (discussed supra
note 58).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 38-49.
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Foreseeability as an Inadequate Mechanism for Determining Damages
The Dillon court purported to replace traditional measures of duty
in mental distress cases with a duty limited only by foreseeability. One
of the Dillon court's mistakes was to announce guidelines that are not
relevant to the foreseeability analysis it so forcefully espoused. Yet the
court made a more fundamental error: it failed to recognize that while
foreseeability may be an appropriate means of determining liability in
mental distress cases, it cannot be used to limit damages for intangible
losses in a socially acceptable way.
The foreseeability principle allows potential defendants to plan for
liability, through insurance coverage and other risk spreading mecha-
nisms, by limiting potential losses to a class of plaintiffs and type of
damage that can be reasonably anticipated if a particular activity is
engaged in negligently.74 The problem with utilizing "foreseeability"
in bystander mental distress cases, however, is that in most instances
involving close relatives such distress is quite foreseeable and the po-
tential losses would be exceedingly burdensome to compensate. 7
5
Courts have long recognized the evident perils of using a wide-open
74. See W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 43, at 267; Fleming, The Passing of Polends, 39
CAN. B. REv. 489, 508-16 & n.93 (1961).
75. Legislative concern for the social costs of allowing recovery for emotional distress
was manifested by the California legislature when it passed the Medical Injury Compensa-
tion Reform Act, 1975 Cal. Stat., 2d Ex. Sess., ch.l, at 3969. Section 24.6 of the Act limits
the recovery for mental distress in medical malpractice cases to $250,000. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1984). This section has been challenged on constitutional
grounds. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 175 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1981) (stat-
ute not a violation of equal protection) (depublished, hearing granted by California
Supreme Court); Sulnick, Medical Malpractice Reform Act (1975); The Failure of ABIXX
(Keene) to Deal with Medical Malpractice-A Constitutional Tragedy, 15 CAL. TRIAL LAW. J.
17, 19-24 (1976); Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Pro-
tection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 951-55 (1979).
Although some form of general legislative limit on recovery for mental distress and
other intangible injuries is possible, it would have no relevance to the damages actually
suffered. It also would not eliminate current inconsistencies that limit recovery to only some
foreseeable plaintiffs.
The potential impact of any restriction on mental distrss recovery may be gauged by the
published "estimate" that 49 cents of each dollar paid in an automobile accident case is for
pain and suffering. See O'Connell, supra note 16, at 355-56 (citing P. KEETON & R. KEE-
TON, TORT: CASES AND MATERIALS 792-93 (2d ed. 1977)); see also M. FRANKLIN &.R.
RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATiVES 445-46 (3d ed. 1983). Presumably this figure primar-
ily includes pain and suffering parasitic to a direct physical injury that would not be affected
by limitations on independent intangible tort recovery. While a significant portion of this
recovery may in fact be utilized to compensate attorneys, the percentage estimated illustrates
the potential economic implications of either expanding or limiting recovery allowed for
intangible losses.
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foreseeability standard when considering liability for non-physical
injuries.
The classic Kinsman decisions76 illustrate the practical difficulties
inherent in relying on foreseeability as a limiting standard. In Kinsman
No. 1, defendants negligently allowed a river to become blocked due to
the collapse of a bridge, resulting in damage to plaintiffs riparian prop-
erty. The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, found the
injury sufficiently foreseeable to impose liability. The court noted that
when "the damages resulted from the same physical forces whose exist-
ence required the exercise of greater care than was displayed and were
of the same general sort that was expectable, unforeseeability of the
exact developments and of the extent of the loss will not limit
liability."
77
Yet in Kinsman No. 2, decided four years later, a unanimous Sec-
ond Circuit panel refused to allow a claim made by the owners of
wheat stored aboard a ship downstream from the same bridge as in
Kinsman No. 1. The plaintiff sought compensation for the added ex-
pense resulting from the inability to move the grain to elevators located
on the other side of the bridge. Such economic loss to those depending
on an unobstructed river was the predictable outcome of the incident,
but after an elaborate analysis of the foreseeability concepts enunciated
in Kinsman No. 1, Judge Kauffman conceded that it "is all a question
of expediency. . . of fair judgement, always keeping in mind the fact
that we endeavor, to make a rule in each case that will be practical and
in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.
'78
Although not analyzed in such terms by the Second Circuit in
Kinsman No. 2, courts traditionally have been hesitant to award dam-
ages for purely economic loss in the absence of personal injury or prop-
erty damage stemming from negligence. 79 In a similar manner, courts
traditionally have refrained from awarding damages for mental distress
unless such distress is parasitic to personal physical injury. 0 The Dil-
lon court rejected the limitation in part and instead suggested that the
traditional mechanism of foreseeability should serve to limit liability.8'
76. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman No. 2), 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968);
Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman No. 1), 338 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1964).
77. Kinsman No. 1, 338 F.2d at 726.
78. Kinsman No. 2, 388 F.2d at 825 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 354-55, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
79. Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence: The Search for a Just Solution, 50 CAN.
B. REv. 580 (1972). See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
80. See supra note 20 & accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 29-31 & accompanying text.
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The experience of the Hawaii Supreme Court is also instructive.
The court initially adopted a pure foreseeability standard for all cases
of serious mental distress, but later retreated when faced with the spec-
tre of unlimited liability. In Rodrigues v. State,8 2 the court endorsed
liability for all foreseeable plaintiffs who suffer serious mental dis-
tress, 83 remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether the
mental distress suffered by the owner of a recently completed home
when it was negligently destroyed was a "reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant's act."'84 The court also affirmed compensa-
tion for the mental distress of a child who witnessed his step-father's
mother killed in an accident. 85 The Hawaii court balked, however,
when asked to allow compensation for the death of a grandfather living
in California, who suffered a heart attack when told that his daughter
and grandaughter had been killed and another grandaughter injured as
a result of the defendant's negligence in Hawaii.86 Although it was
surely foreseeable that a grandfather would suffer mental distress under
these circumstances, the geographical distance ultimately proved too
great for the court to justify compensation. The court, while purporting
to adhere to the concept of foreseeability, imposed the strict require-
ment that plaintiffs be near the scene of the accident, expressly noting
the need to limit liability.8 7
82. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
83. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
84. Id. at 175, 472 P.2d at 521.
85. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
86. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 208-09, 532 P.2d 673, 676
(1975).
87. The court stated:
[In the factual context of the instant case, we are of the opinion that merely requir-
ing the proof of serious mental distress, rather than minor mental distress, does not
realistically and reasonably limit the liability of the appellees. Without a reason-
able and proper limitation of the scope of the duty of care owed by appellees,
appellees would be confronted with an unmanageable, unbearable and totally un-
predictable liability. [As stated by Dean Prosser:] "It would be an entirely unrea-
sonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has endangered one
man were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person
disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and
every distant relative of the person injured, as well as his friends.
Stated in a different terminology, but reaching the same conclusion as above,
we hold that the appellees could not reasonably foresee the consequences to Mr.
Kelley. Clearly, Mr. Kelley's location from the scene of the accident was too re-
mote. We hold that the duty of care enunciated in Rodrigues and Leong... ap-
plies to plaintiffs meeting the standards stated in said cases, and who were located
within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident.
Id at 208-09, 532 P.2d at 676 (quoting W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
[Vol. 35
It is apparent that the use of a foreseeability standard to assess
non-physical damages often is inconsistent with the kinds of injuries
that courts, and society, are prepared to compensate. Courts will com-
pensate for foreseeable physical injuries, but are not willing to "open
the floodgates" by compelling compensation for all foreseeable mental
distress. A major policy concern of the courts is that compensation for
foreseeable intangible losses should not impose too much of a burden
on potential defendants and the insured community. 8s The California
Supreme Court, quoting the New York Court of Appeals, has ex-
pressed this concern as follows: "'Every injury has ramifying conse-
quences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for
the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable
degree.' "89 This tension is reflected in Dillon itself, which on the one
hand utilized and glorified the concept of foreseeability, but on the
other hand issued guidelines that limit recovery even when the plaintiff
has suffered clearly foreseeable mental injury.
Thus the question finally can be posed: Is there a workable and
analytically sound way to use foreseeability as a determinant of liabil-
ity while limiting compensation to socially acceptable levels? To an-
swer this question it is useful to examine the California case of MAolien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and compare the cases involving other
branches of intangible tort law.
§ 54, at 334 (4th ed. 1971)). Although the court purported to adhere to a foreseeability
analysis, it in fact imposed a vague spatial limit unrelated to a foreseeability analysis. Such
a result is reminiscent of the Dillon guidelines. See supra notes 38-59 & accompanying text.
The arbitrariness of limited liability based on mere "geography" is illustrated by the
Hawaii Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63
Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981), in which the court allowed six members of the plaintiff
family to recover for mental distress caused by the accidental death of the family dog. The
Campbell court distinguished Leong, stating that the geographical limitation requiring "rea-
sonable distance from the scene of the tortious event" was met "since the plaintiffs and their
dog were [all] located in Honolulu." Id. at 561-62, 632 P.2d at 1069.
88. See supra note 75 and infra notes 89, 125-32 & accompanying text.
The recent English decision of McLoughlin v. O'Brien, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 982, may be
read to endorse foreseeability as the appropriate limitation on liability for mental distress.
See Tepp, Liability for NeglZgently Inflicted Nervous Shock, 99 LAW Q. REv. 100 (1983).
Since the level of compensation in England for intangible losses is so much lower than in
America the need to consider the problem of excessive liability is not as compelling in Eng-
land. See Hinz v. Berry, 2 Q.B. 40, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1074; P. JAMES & D. BROWN, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 432-34 (4th ed. 1978).
89. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 306 (1977) (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554,561(1969)). In Borer, the court decided that there was no cause of action
for loss of affection and society between parent and child when a parent was negligently
injured. See infra notes 121-36 & accompanying text.
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Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Pure
Foreseeability Revived
Some commentators believe that the 1980 California Supreme
Court decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals90 points the
way out of the Dillon quagmire. The court allowed a husband to re-
cover for mental distress caused by an incorrect diagnosis that his wife
had syphilis and by the resulting breakup of their marriage. Defendant
Kaiser argued that the husband did not meet the Dillon requirements
because he neither observed the alleged negligent diagnosis nor was
near the scene of that diagnosis.91 The court, however, concluded that
the three Dillon guidelines were relevant only when the plaintiff sought
recovery as a bystander who "suffered as a percipient witness to the
injury of a third person. ' 92 The Molien court held that the "plaintiff
was himself a direct victim of the assertedly negligent act" 93 because
the disease is normally transmitted only by sexual relations. 94 For the
same reason, and because marital suspicion and hostility are predict-
able results of such a diagnosis, the court found that injury to the plain-
tiff was reasonably foreseeable.95 Moreover, the court rejected the
notion that the mental distress of "direct victims" must be physically
manifested. 96 The court concluded that Dillon was relevant to Molien
only for its affirmation of the "general principle of foreseeability."
97
Molien has been praised by several commentators as a reaffirma-
tion of the broad foreseeability standard that was endorsed at least in
principle by the Dillon court.98 Yet, in Hathaway and Cortez, both de-
cided after Molien, the court of appeal strictly applied the Dillon guide-
lines, noting that Molien was inapposite to bystander mental distress
cases.99 It would thus appear that the California courts now impose a
90. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). See infra note 98 & accom-
panying text.
91. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
92. Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
95. Id.
96. Id. See infra notes 110-14 & accompanying text (elimination of requirement of
physical manifestation of injury).
97. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
98. See, e.g., Nolan & Ursin, supra note 3, at 610; Comment, supra note 3, at 312;
Comment, supra note 13, at 187-88.
99. Hathaway, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 736-37, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440-41; Cortez, 110 Cal.
App. 3d at 648-50, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10. Because the diagnosis of syphilis in Molien
could be construed as a diagnosis that the husband was the source of the infection, the facts
in Molien can be distinguished from the alleged malpractice in Cortez and Justus in which
parents were precluded from recovering for mental distress. The alleged malpractice in
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traditional or "pure" foreseeability test for "direct victims" of negli-
gently inflicted mental distress, but invoke the three Dillon criteria for
"bystanders" who seek recovery for such mental distress.
While it may be possible to distinguish between "direct" and "by-
stander" victims, one recent California Court of Appeal decision ob-
scured any meaningful distinction. In Sesma v. Cueto, °00 the expectant
parents claimed mental distress as a result of alleged medical negli-
gence resulting in stillbirth. The court rejected the defendants' argu-
ment that the mother could be characterized as a bystander during the
delivery operation and thus be limited in her recovery by Dillon. 101 It
further held that Molien "supports the conclusion that. . the father
. . . may be able to show that he is a 'direct victim'-if not percipient
witness--of negligent acts giving rise to infliction of serious emotional
distress."' 0 2 The Sesma court's broad conception of "direct victim" on
these facts contradicts the California Supreme Court's pre-Molien deci-
sion in Justus,10 3 and demonstrates the hazards of trying to characterize
an injury as "direct" or "indirect."' 4 This distinction is reminiscent of
the difficulty faced by those courts attempting to distinguish direct from
indirect causes for purposes of determining proximate cause rather
than rely on a single standard such as foreseeability10 5 Aside from this
Molien involved a diagnosis concerning the husband as well as his wife in light of the sexual
nature of the disease.
100. 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982).
101. Id. at 115 n.2, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 15 n.2.
102. Id. at 116, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
103. See supra notes 53-56 & accompanying text.
104. The Sesma court's concept of "direct" liability was expanded even further in a
products liability case, Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983).
The California Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs were direct victims of a manufac-
turer's negligence. The plaintiffs, a mother and daughter, witnessed the death of a close
friend in a water skiing accident. The mother was the owner and operator of the boat pull-
ing the skier, and the daughter was was a passenger in the boat "spotting" the skier. The
steering wheel locked as a result of an alleged defect in the boat, causing the boat to collide
with and kill the skier. The plaintiffs brought claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under Dillon, but the court barred these claims because the plaintiffs did not have a
legally cognizable relationship with the skier. Id. at 585, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 907. The court
held, however, that the plaintiffs were direct victims under Molien. Id. at 587-88, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 909. The court reasoned that the manufacturer "should reasonably have foreseen
that Kately, as purchaser and operator of the defective boat, would suffer emotional distress
when the boat malfunctioned and killed or injured another human being." Id. Moreover,
because of a state statute that requires the presence of someone in the boat to observe the
progress of the skier, "it was certainly foreseeable that [the daughter] who undertook this
duty, would witness any injury to the water-skier. . . [and] suffer emotional distress [as a
result]." Id. at 588-89, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
105. See F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 23, § 20, at 1155-56; W. PROSSER, supra
note 21, § 43, at 250-70.
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difficulty, the direct/indirect distinction does not eliminate the incon-
sistent recoveries allowed "indirect" plaintiffs subject to the Dillon
rules.
Several recent proposals advocate extending the Molien foresee-
ability analysis to cover both "direct" and "indirect" victims of negli-
gent infliction of mental distress, while limiting recovery to "serious"
distress.106 These proposals simply do not confront the fundamental
judicial concern about excessive recovery. Barring recovery for minor
emotional injury may eliminate some litigation and legal costs, 10 7 as
well as the cumulative impact of small recoveries, but will have no im-
pact on the potential for substantial recoveries for real and foreseeable
psychological trauma. Such "serious" distress claims are to be ex-
pected in most cases brought by relatives.
An earlier proposal to alter the Dillon guidelines so that all close
relatives, regardless of their "nearness" to the accident, could recover
for foreseeable mental distress, 08 suffers from the same weakness. It
approximates a pure foreseeability standard but offers no significant
additional limitation on recovery beyond the concept of foreseeability.
The proposal would not eliminate the problem of excessive recoveries,
as "close relatives" would present most of the valid claims anyway.
In summary, neither the Dillon court's strictly limited notion of
foreseeability nor the Molien court's elaboration of the standard offers
hope of resolving the compensation dilemma. However, the courts
have addressed this problem in cases involving intangible losses other
than mental distress. A review of these cases will bring into focus the
appropriate response.
Other Developments in Intangible Tort Law-The Dividing
Lines Disappear
One of the most significant aspects of the Molien decision is the
court's rejection of the requirement of physical manifestation of injury
in "direct" negligent infliction of mental distress cases. 10 9 The Molien
court noted that the physical manifestation requirement had been justi-
fied as a mechanism to insure that emotional distress is genuine," 10 but
106. See supra note 13.
107. No recovery is permitted in any event without proving culpable negligent behavior.
This principle already precludes recovery for much minor mental distress.
108. See Liebson, supra note 3, at 195-201; see also Comment, Horizons, supra note 3, at
198-201; Comment, Recognizing, supra note 3, at 168.
109. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 924-31, 616 P.2d at 817-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835-39.
110. Id.
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concluded that false claims are poorly screened by a rule that permits
physical injury no matter how trivial to be "the ticket for admission to
the courthouse.""' The opinion reasoned that the requirement "denies
court access to claims that may well be valid and could be proved if the
plaintiffs were permitted to go to trial."" 2 The court also concluded
that the requirement of physical injury encouraged "extravagant plead-
ing and distorted testimony" and forced victims to emphasize in their
testimony symptoms that are difficult to verify such as headaches, nau-
sea, and insomnia. 3 The court noted that modem medical and psy-
chiatric knowledge no longer recognize a clear distinction between
purely mental and physical injury and that efforts to distinguish them
are artificial and arbitrary, and obscure consideration of "whether the
plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury."
114
The court has recognized that the same reasoning applies to Dillon
bystander types of claims as well. In Hedlund v. Superior Court, " 5 the
court allowed a Dillon-type claim on allegations of psychological
trauma alone, concluding that Molen had abrogated the physical in-
jury requirement of Dillon."16
By abolishing the physical injury requirement, MAolien and Hed-
lund undermine the court's rationale in its earlier decision in Borer v.
American Airlines, Inc. 117 for distinguishing the tort of negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress from other torts giving rise to independent
claims for intangible damages.
Three years before Borer, in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ,118
the California Supreme Court held that a married person whose spouse
had been injured by the negligence of a third party could maintain a
cause of action for loss of consortium. The court defined loss of con-
sortium as the "loss of conjugal fellowship and sexual relations,"" 9
which included such intangible damages as the loss of love, compan-
ionship, society, sexual relations, and household services.' 20
In Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. ,121 however, the court rejected
111. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
112. Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
113. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
114. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
115. 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983).
116. Id. at 706 n.8, 669 P.2d at 47 n.8, 194 Cal. Rptr. 811 n.8.
117. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 450, 563 P.2d 838, 864-65, 138 Cal. Rptr 302, 308-09 (1977).
118. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
119. Id. at 385, 525 P.2d at 670, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766 (1974).
120. Id. at 404-05, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
121. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
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the contention that "logical symmetry" compelled it to recognize a sim-
ilar cause of action for loss of affection and society between parent and
child when a parent was negligently injured. 22 The Borer court noted
that there were qualitative differences that distinguished the spousal
relationship from the parent-child relationship, specifically the differ-
ence of sexual relations. Yet the court acknowledged that loss of con-
sortium suits compensated for intangible losses beyond mere
deprivation of sexual relations. 1' Indeed, "[c]ertain aspects of spousal
relationship are similar to those of the parent-child relationship, and
there can be little question of the reality of the loss suffered by a child
deprived of the society and care of its parent."
124
Nevertheless, the Borer court concluded that "strong policy rea-
sons" justified denying compensation for loss of society between parent
and child. 125 Specifically, while suits by spouses for lost consortium
involve only one additional plaintiff, the "problems of multiplication of
actions and damages" that could result from authorizing children to
sue for loss of parental society "might well become a serious problem to
a particular defendant as well as in terms of the total cost of such en-
hanced awards to the insured community as a whole."' 26 The court
reasoned:
We cannot ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of
parental consortium merely because the money to pay such awards
comes initially from the "negligent" defendant or his insurer. Realis-
tically the burden of payment of awards for loss of consortium must
be borne by the public generally in increased insurance premiums or,
otherwise, in the enhanced danger that accrues from the greater
number of people who may choose to go without any insurance. We
must also take into account the cost of administration of a system to
determine and pay consortium awards; since virtually every serious
injury to a parent would engender a claim for loss of consortium on
behalf of each of his or her children, the expense of settling or litigat-
ing such claims would be sizable.
127
The court therefore distinguished Borer from other cases in which it
had emphasized foreseeability as the only proper limitation on duty.
The court noted that those decisions did not involve "the creation of a
122. Id. at 446, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306. In a companion case, the court
rejected a parent's claim for loss of society for an injured child. Baxter v. Superior Court, 19
Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
123. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 448, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
124. Id. at 446, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306 (quoting Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal.
App. 3d 744, 746, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (1975)).
125. Id. at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
126. Id. at 448-49, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
127. Id at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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new cause of action for solely intangible damages, attended with
problems of multiplication of claims and liability."'
128
Moreover, the court noted that it is difficult to measure the amount
of damages in such cases because of their "intangible character"
129 :
Loss of consortium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss; monetary
compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship
and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that upon
reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of maternal
gidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and women. To say
tat plaintiffs have been "compensated" for their loss is superficial;
in reality they have suffered a loss for which they can never be com-
pensated; they have obtained, instead, a future benefit essentially un-
related to that loss.'
30
These concerns, while not enough to preclude a loss-of-spousal-consor-
tium tort, were viewed as significant in the context of parent-child
claims where there is the potential for multiple plaintiffs.'
3 '
The court also noted the danger of the duplicative recovery that
might result if a child were permitted to recover for loss of parental
society. 132 The court persuasively distinguished its willingness in
Krouse v. Graham 133 to allow non-pecuniary damages for loss of par-
ent-child society in a wrongful death claim, an interpretation not com-
pelled by the wrongful death statute. 134 The court observed that, if the
parent dies, "the wrongful death action serves as the only means by
which the family unit can recover compensation for the loss of parental
care and services." 135 In the case of non-fatal injury, however, the vic-
tim's personal injury claim may provide substantial recovery to the
family unit.1
36
Most significantly, the Borer court carefully distinguished loss of
parent-child society actions from Dillon-type mental distress actions on
the ground that the plaintiff in Dillon was required to show physical
injury caused by witnessing the infliction of injury upon a family mem-
ber.'37 The Borer court concluded that Dillon supported its decision
"to deny a cause of action founded upon purely intangible injury."'
138
128. Id at 450, 563 P.2d at 864, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
129. Id at 448, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
130. Id at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
131. Id. at 448-49, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr at 307.
132. Id at 448, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
133. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
134. Id. at 67-68, 562 P.2d at 1025-26, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67.
135. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 452, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 450, 563 P.2d at 864-65, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09.
138. Id.
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In light of the court's decisions in Molien and Hedlund, this distinction
between physical and non-physical manifestation of psychological in-
jury no longer exists, and Dillon bystander claims only can be logically
viewed in the context of loss of society and other intangible tort claims.
The policy concerns expressed by the Borer court are clearly germane
to Dillon-type claims.
Toward a Unified Theory of Compensation
Independent developments in various areas of intangible tort law
provide inconsistent rules that may bear little relation to underlying
policy. Victims of injury to the parent-child relationship are denied
compensation for intangible damages for loss of society, while victims
of injury to a spousal relationship are granted compensation for "loss
of consortium," which include similar intangible losses. 139 The Dillon
and Molien rules mandate liability only for some instances of foresee-
able negligent infliction of emotional distress without making princi-
pled distinctions between those plaintiffs who receive or are denied
compensation. A plaintiff qualifying under Dillon may also recover
under a loss of consortium claim if it is a spouse who is injured. On the
other hand, if a child or parent is injured, the plaintiff-parent or child
will be denied recovery for loss of society and perhaps, depending on
the circumstances, for a Dillon-type mental distress claim as well.'
40
Furthermore, the primary victim's own recovery may provide either ex-
cessive or gravely inadequate compensation for the special out-of-
pocket expenses incurred by relatives and others as a result of mental
distress and loss of society,' 4 ' and there is no assurance that what is
recovered will be appropriately allocated to third parties.
Despite such inconsistent standards for liability and recovery, the
courts have clearly indicated the policy imperatives that should shape
intangible tort law. There is, of course, a fundamental commitment to
the use of foreseeability as a tool of justice. Foreseeability facilitates
rational risk spreading and correlates liability with the risks that the
defendant should expect. This commitment to foreseeabilty is tem-
pered by the court's desire not to place an excessive economic burden
on potential defendants and the insured community. The mechanical
application of the Dillon rules by the California Supreme Court, its
effort to limit foreseeability principles to "direct victims" in Molien,
139. See supra notes 121-31 & accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 132-36 and infra notes 141-57 & accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 149-50 & accompanying text.
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and its rejection in Borer of a cause of action for loss of society between
parent and child, all clearly indicate that this limit on duty is a fore-
most concern.
The court is also clearly concerned about the danger of double
recovery within the single economic unit of the family, especially in the
case of intangible damages. 142 The court has no doubt also considered
that permitting multiple family members to recover for intangible
losses would substantially increase the cost of recovery to the insured
community. Indeed, the court's willingness inMolen to fully compen-
sate "direct" but not "indirect" victims of mental distress can be under-
stood as an effort to eliminate possible double recovery by the family
unit.1
43
It is time to reconcile these competing policy imperatives and es-
tablish a rational, uniform system that will equitably compensate vic-
tims of intangible torts while reasonably limiting the exposure of
defendants and minimizing the danger of multiple recoveries in the
family unit. There are two evident paths.
One approach is to compensate all intangible psychological inju-
ries on the same basis that traditional physical injuries are compen-
sated, limited only by the threshold barrier of foreseeability. This
would eliminate the inequitable exclusion of some intangible psycho-
logical losses. It would not, however, allay judicial fears of infinite lia-
bility. Indeed, courts appear remarkably united in their resistance to
such an approach. While Hawaii had articulated a pure foreseeability
standard for negligent infliction of mental distress, it subsequently re-
canted.144 The majority physical zone of danger rule and the Dillon
guidelines also represent attempts to prevent excessive liability. Few
states recognize loss of parent-society claims brought by a child 45 and
only a small minority recognize a negligence claim for loss of child-
society brought by a parent. 146
The recent cases add new support to the better approach, first ad-
142. See supra notes 132-36 & accompanying text. See also Ursin & Levy, Tort Law in
Calfornia: At the Crossroads, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 497, 521-30 (1979), for an excellent discus-
sion of family unit recovery.
143. See supra notes 83-87 & accompanying text.
144. See supra note 87 & accompanying text.
145. See Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's
Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d
424 (1981).
146. See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
Miller v. Subia, 514 P.2d 79 (Colo. App. 1973); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225
N.W.2d 495 (1975).
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vanced by Professor Richard Miller, that a defendant's liability should
extend to all foreseeable plaintiffs who suffer serious mental injury, but
that recovery should be limited to economic "out of pocket" losses.
47
The inconsistencies among the intangible tort cases further suggest that
Miller's thesis should be substantially extended to include similar com-
pensation for independent tort claims based on loss of consortium be-
tween spouses and loss of society between parent and child.
Such an approach in the context not only of negligent infliction of
mental distress, but also loss of consortium and society, would address
the basic policy dilemma articulated by the courts in recent decisions.
It would retain foreseeability as the standard for determining liability,
but would place a reasonable limit on the potential burden on defend-
ants, and would eliminate the danger of multiple recoveries by requir-
ing each plaintiff to demonstrate out-of-pocket losses. Such an
approach would also eliminate the arbitrary denial of recovery by
plaintiffs who do not pass the various tests for recovery under different
tort theories for recovery of intangible losses. Fairer compensation to
all victims of intangible torts would result.
Limiting recovery to economic loss admittedly would reduce the
amount of recovery some plaintiffs would receive for intangible losses.
On the other hand, it would expand recovery where recovery is now
unfairly denied. So long as the courts remain unwilling to attempt to
compensate all intangible losses for the reasons articulated in Borer, it
appears untenable not to at least compensate as a first priority the out-
of-pocket costs caused by mental distress and the loss of society to rela-
tives. Such out-of-pocket losses would include loss of wages, and costs
of medical and psychiatric care and services needed to alleviate loss of
society or mental distress.
It should be emphasized that broader recovery for non-pecuniary
intangible losses to the family unit would still flourish under this ap-
proach.148 If the victim of an accident survives, his or her own personal
injury suit allows the plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering and
other non-economic injuries. In a wrongful death action, non-pecuni-
ary losses for loss of parent-child society and spousal consortium are
now granted in California and can be justified in the unique context of
wrongful death actions, as suggested by the Borer court, to insure some
compensation for the lost life beyond economic loss, as well as to also
147. See supra note 16 & accompanying text.
148. Some commentators would not allow any compensation for pain and suffering. See
supra note 16.
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provide a fund for contingent attorney fees. 149 Furthermore, in appro-
priate cases punitive damages can be awarded for personal injury or
survival claims.
1 50
It is understandable that courts would resist unlimited recovery for
independent tort actions based on loss of society and mental distress
claims when the family unit already recovers for intangible injuries.
Yet there may be severe out of pocket losses suffered by a relative,
friend, or bystander that are not adequately accounted for by the per-
sonal injury or wrongful death recovery. 51 Dillon-type mental distress
claims, loss of spousal consortium, and parent-child society claims
should be viewed as parasitic recoveries that meet additional real out-
of-pocket needs rather than giving additional bounty to some and ig-
noring potentially severe needs of others. So long as there must be
limits, there must also be principled priorities. In short, the courts
should view intangible tort recovery in a unified context.
A recent California Supreme Court case, Turpin v. Sortini, 52 now
followed in the state of Washington, 153 may demonstrate a new willing-
ness to utilize a limited recovery approach. In Turpin, the supreme
court recognized a new tort for "wrongful life" and allowed a child to
recover damages from a defendant who negligently allowed his birth.
The court restricted recovery to special damages for the extraordinary
expenses incurred by the child for specialized teaching and equipment,
refusing a claim for general damages.' 54 The court noted that in Borer
it had declined to recognize a new cause of action for the loss of affec-
tion and society of the parent-child relationship because "monetary
damages would neither relieve nor provide meaningful compensation
for the child's or parent's loss,' 55 and because of the difficulty of mea-
suring intangible damages. 56 Nevertheless, the Turpin court recog-
nized that when extraordinary medical and other expenses are caused
149. See supra notes 133-36 & accompanying text. If the courts continue to distinguish
between direct and bystander claims, an argument could be made for allowing recovery for
non-pecuniary losses in "direct" claims, since recovery for intangible injury will not other-
wise be provided for in a primary victim's personal injury or wrongful death claim. But see
supra 100-04 (discussion of extending concept of "direct victim"). See also Comment, Rec-
ognizing, supra note 3, at 162-67.
150. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980).
151. See supra notes 132-36.
152. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
153. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
154. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237-38, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
155. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447, 563 P.2d at 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
156. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (quoting Baxter v.
Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 464, 563 P.2d 871, 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 315 (1977)).
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by negligence, public policy requires that the measurable loss be borne
by the negligent party.1 57 The Turpin court's recognition of the wrong-
ful life theory reflects a willingness to accept a new tort while limiting
the damages available upon a finding of liability. Such an approach
for the torts of negligent inflection of mental distress and loss of consor-
tium and society would ensure appropriate compensation while avoid-
ing excessive liability and inequitable line drawing. In short, a new
remedy is available to resolve the old Dillon paradox.
Conclusion
Dillon v. Legg and the line of cases following it are flawed. They
affirm the concept of compensating all foreseeable plaintiffs for the
negligent infliction of mental distress and then provide criteria that do
not correspond with foreseeability. The error in Dillon and its progeny
is not, as some have suggested, the rigid application of criteria that
were meant as mere guidelines to determine whether the plaintiff is
foreseeable and consequently owed a duty. The error consists of using
foreseeability to limit compensation in the first instance. While ideally
all mental distress should be compensated, expediency and practicality
often preclude compensation when the liablity would be too much of a
burden on socially useful activity that on occasion may be conducted
negligently.
The majority rule limiting compensation to those within the physi-
cal zone of danger and the rules espoused in Dillon and Molien all
attempt to utilize the concept of duty to choose the plaintiff who will be
compensated. Yet none of these guidelines focuses either on foresee-
ability or on any other equitable rationale. The courts should, after
sixteen years of confusion and arbitrary line drawing, focus on what
kinds of damages should be compensated and make possible equitable
compensation of all foreseeable plaintiffs. By compensating mental
distress, but only to the extent of economic losses, courts would recon-
cile the competing policies underlying intangible tort law and eliminate
the resulting confusion and inequities. The recent California Supreme
Court decision in Turpin v. Sortini suggests that some courts may now
be receptive to such an approach.
157. Id. at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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